T n this study, I seek to explain a paradoxical -*effect of multi-unionism on strike inci dence: although union power within bar gaining structures is lower when two or more unions negotiate with the employer (the defi nition of "multi-unionism") than when only one does, the mainly comparative studies of this subject report higher strike activity under multi-unionism. Unlike in the United States, where multi-unionism disappeared after the Wagner Act in 1935 (Gould 2004:29) , exclu sive jurisdiction is the exception in Europe confederations are divided along political (50%), religious (25%), or occupational (sta tus) lines (25%), or a combination of these three (Eurofound 2006 (Eurofound , 2007 . Even in the four countries with just one union confedera tion?the United Kingdom, Austria, Ireland, and Latvia?multi-union bargaining is not unknown: unaffiliated unions and union representation by several unions within the same confederation are found in all four of these nations. Thus, the industrial relations environment in Europe differs sharply from that in North America, where one particular union has the exclusive right to represent employees in a particular firm. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (July 2008 Countries with more than one confedera tion experience higher rates of strikes than do those with a single confederation. Most of these studies explicitly or implicitly posit that this higher incidence of strikes can be explained by the propagandistic value of strikes to labor unions, which compete with one another for membership.
The higher incidence of strikes is thus attributed to union rivalry. A second, smaller body of literature is based mainly on economic analysis. These studies, which all concern U.K. industrial relations, find that the number of unions bargaining with an employer is linked both inefficiency, and product growth, see Pohjola (1984) ; for its effects on wages and strike incidence, see Webb and Webb 1897; Galenson 1940; Ross and Irwin 1951; Gitlow 1952; Lester 1958; Ross and Hartman 1960; Krislov 1960; Clegg 1976; Freeman and Britain 1977; Korpi and Shalev 1979; Visser 1987; Franzosi 1989; Battista 1991; Cohn 1993; Ingram et al. 1993; Machin et al. 1993; Franzosi 1995; and Stout 1995. Does the higher strike incidence result from (Clegg 1976:71) . According to Clegg, union rivalry explains this anomaly. Rivalry within and between unions (especially in France)
pushed up the incidence of strikes. The high incidence of strikes was an interaction effect of company-level bargaining and inter-union rivalry. Clegg argued that a decentralized bargaining structure leads to fierce competi tion within and between labor unions, thus implying that union competition is the real mechanism producing higher levels of strike frequency. Korpi and Shalev (1979) also pointed to divisions within the labor movement to explain the incidence of strikes. They sug gested that, rather than institutional factors such as the level at which bargaining occurs and conflict resolution structures, it is the power relations between capital and labor that explain strike frequencies. sumed that in pillarized2 societies, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, the weakness of a divided labor movement is compensated for by their formation of coalitions with like minded political parties.
In their efforts to explain differences in strike activity between countries, the comparativists find a relationship between divisions in labor movements and strike fre quency, which they explain with a mechanism on a quite different level. Only Korpi Although the United Kingdom is not characterized by a divided labor movement, multi-unionism is common in British plants and companies (Machin et al. 1993) , and the United Kingdom, surprisingly, is the only country for which internationally published research has been conducted on the effects of multi-unionism.
Several studies have investi gated the effect of multi-unionism on strikes in the United Kingdom and have found a positive relationship (Stewart 1987; Ingram et al. 1993; Machin et al. 1993 dox. This paradox can best be understood when we view the union's decision to engage in industrial conflict from the perspective of the leadership. The leadership will assess the potential benefits of a strike. This judgment will be based on (a) the potential value of the concession from the employer?which may consist of improvements, like wage increases, or the prevention of a deteriora tion in employment conditions?and (b) the probability that a strike will succeed in forc ing the employer to make such a concession (Hicks 1963) . The labor union assesses the probability of such a concession on the basis of, among other things, its bargaining power and the bargaining power of the employer.
Assuming that a union's membership is an important determinant of its bargaining power (see Britt and Galle 1972; Crouch 1982; Gramm 1986; Martin 1992) , this implies that a labor union in competition with other unions has to share its potential bargaining power with other unions (Akkerman et al. 1995 ) . This problem will tend to weaken such a union's bargaining power, irrespective of the power of the employer (assuming that the total rate of unionization is constant). The probability of winning a strike will therefore be smaller for unions that negotiate within a bargaining unit in which more than one union operates. The reduced chances of winning a strike will reduce the expected utility of a strike for these unions.
A possible effect of this weakened posi tion is reduced effectiveness of strikes under multi-unionism. For example, an employer who is aware that a union is weakened by this dynamic may force the union into a strike. However, the ultimate decision to call a strike rests with the union, which is not likely to take the fatal step of initiating a foredoomed strike. An unsuccessful strike would not improve the membership's trust in the union in the long run and would be an implausible strategy for a union to follow in order to retain or enlarge its membership.
A more plausible effect of the reduced expected utility of striking is therefore a reduced incidence of strikes. By this reasoning, union splits should reduce rather than increase strike activity. (Machin et al. 1993:283) . This increases the probability that the demands of at least one of the unions will not be satisfied, thereby increasing the probability of a strike. Moreover, the em ployer, who is not fully informed even when bargaining with one union, will face further informational difficulties when assessing the costs and probabilities of the unions' strate gies.
The employer needs to assess not only the probability of a strike by one or other of the unions, but also the probability of the unions cooperating in a strike. This increases the scope for misjudgments, which again results in a higher probability of a strike. In cases where rival strikes occur, these would orginate from substantive reasons: unfulfilled bargaining claims. The effect of multi-unionism should therefore be greater in heterogeneous sectors where workers ' interests diverge the most (hypoth esis I). (Machin et al. 1993.) An alternative explanation for the paradox is that labor's weakness may drive unions into a struggle to survive. In this struggle, have cited potential methodological prob lems arising from differences across coun tries in the definition and measurement of "strikes" (Edwards and Hyman 1994:252,253; Stokke 2001:248 Granted that strike frequency may not be the most reliable indicator of industrial con flict in international comparisons, however, I argue that for the purposes of the present study, it is the most valid dependent variable. First, a competition-motivated decision to call a strike will most likely be reflected in the number of strikes. The other indicators are 3Among my selected countries, this holds for Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
A rather simple solution to this problem, proposed by Edward and Hyman (1994) , would be to omit short strikes for every country. How ever, the ILO yearbook only provides aggregated data, which makes it impossible to identify individual strikes and their duration.
4However, Hyman (1989:18-19) was also skeptical about the reliability of the number of workers involved in a strike and working days lost. less straightforward, because union leaders are less able to control the other character istics of a strike: strike duration is mainly determined by the resistance of the employer (Hicks 1963; Crouch 1982) , and the number of employees on strike is largely dependent on the number of employees, or unionized employees, within the sector (Akkerman etal. 1995 (1997, 2006) , from which data concerning the number of strikes in the selected sectors 
Explanatory Variables
The number of trade unions in a sector is used to proxy multi-unionism. The number of unions by sector, taken from Ebbinghaus and Visser's (2000) database,6 is shown in Table 2 .
Control Variables
The dependent variable, strike frequency, is not scale-free and is likely to reflect the size of the work force of a nation or sector. To exclude the possibility that the relationship between the number of unions and strike frequency is caused by the size of a sector (and therefore the number of potential 5For some of the more recent years, data collection failed for some countries, such as Belgium, because of too many missing cases.
6Unpublished, but made available to the author. conflicts), I control for number of employees (ILO 1997 (ILO , 2006 and number of enterprises in the sector (OECD 2007) . To isolate the effect of multi-unionism from the effects of the business cycle (Campolieti et al. 2005 
Method
To address the methodological problems associated with the international compara tive studies discussed, I estimate the effects of multi-unionism by means of a multi-level analysis.10 This enables me to estimate (a) the extent to which strike frequencies dif fer between countries and (b) the extent to which this can be explained by sector-level characteristics.
The multi-level analysis also partly resolves the reliability issue that arises in comparing strike frequencies: we may safely assume that the comparison of strikes at the sector level is not distorted by differ ent methods of measures of strikes, which means that making comparisons within countries is less problematic (Edwards and Hyman 1994:252) . I use years as cases for each country and sector, which means that the cases (years) are nested in countries, and in sectors. In order to control for this nested structure, I distinguish a third level in the multi-level analysis: years.
Results
The multi-level analysis generates infor mation of three kinds. First, it estimates the effect of the explanatory variables, just like an ordinary regression. This effect is called the fixed effect, which can be evaluated by a t-test.
Second, it estimates the random effects, or the variance. This variance is divided between variance at the highest level and variance at each lower level. The analysis of the effect of multi-unionism on strike frequencies dis tinguishes between years at the lowest level, sectors at the middle level, and countries at the highest level. In an empty model, that is, a model without explanatory variables, these random effects inform us about the degree of variance at the various levels distinguished (Snijders and Bosker 1999) . The variance at the sector level shows how the sectors differ 10The multi-level analysis was performed with MLwiN version 2.02. incidence is higher when unemployment is higher. This is a remarkable finding, since most (Northern American) studies have reported a negative effect (Kaufman 1982; McConnell 1990; Franzosi 1995:30) , although several exceptions have also been found (Gramm 1986; Ingram et al. 1993 ).
Multi-level analysis leads to two important conclusions.
First, I have determined this effect to be a sector-level effect. Second, the number of labor unions appears to have an important effect on strike frequency not in all sectors, but in two. The effect is larg est in manufacturing, a sector classified as having the most heterogeneous work force; this confirms the findings of British research (Dobson 1997) . The effect is smaller, though still statistically significant, for transport, a sector classified as having medium hetero geneity. This, combined with the lack of the effect of the number of unions in the homogeneous construction sector, indi cates that multi-unionism is related to the heterogeneity of occupational composition of the work force within sectors. This find ing supports hypothesis I, which states that unions compete for primacy in bargaining, not for members. Weakening this tentative conclusion, however, is the finding that the number of unions has no effect in the trade sector, a sector that is also classified as having medium heterogeneity.
Conclusion
This article is aimed at reinvigorating the debate on the positive relationship between a divided labor movement and strike activity, the investigation of strikes is more appropri ately conducted at the sector level than at the national level.
The results of the statistical test performed in this study, using 17 years of strike data from four industrial sectors in seven European countries, confirm the relationship between the number of unions and strike frequency, and also show that this relationship is a sector level rather than national-level phenomenon. Summing up, I see this study as making two contributions. The more important of the two is the study's demonstration of the value of investigating the sector level to identify and explain patterns of strike activity, which sug gests the advisability of adding a sub-national perspective to traditional comparative indus trial relations research. Second, although the analysis presented here has not definitively settled the question of why multi-unionism is associated with higher strike incidence, it has at least provided some theoretical elaboration concerning the dynamics ofthat relationship, including the development of two testable hypotheses.
